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CASE NOTE 
 
REEVALUATING GALAVIZ V. BERG:  AN ANALYSIS OF FORUM-
SELECTION PROVISIONS IN UNILATERALLY ADOPTED  
CORPORATE BYLAWS AS REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS 
BONNIE WHITE† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of a passing comment and footnote in In re Revlon, Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation,1 Delaware practitioners have grappled with the 
enforceability of forum-selection provisions adopted in corporate 
charters and bylaws.  After the Delaware Chancery Court decided In re 
Revlon in 2010, most practitioners concluded that such a provision 
would be enforceable under Delaware corporate law.  However in 
2011, in Galaviz v. Berg—a case of first impression—the Northern Dis-
trict of California rejected the contention in In re Revlon that forum-
selection provisions adopted by Delaware corporations should be con-
tractually enforceable.2  The court in Galaviz instead held that a fo-
rum-selection provision contained in a bylaw unilaterally adopted by a 
board of directors was not binding on shareholders under federal 
procedural law governing forum-selection provisions.3  Still, given the 
uncertainty regarding the enforceability of forum-selection provisions 
 
†
Senior Editor, Volume 161, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  J.D. Candidate, 
2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, Boston University. 
1 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
2 See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174-75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Under these 
circumstances, there is no basis for the Court to disregard the plaintiffs’ choice of  
forum . . . .”). 
3 Id. 
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in other jurisdictions, many practitioners continue to advise compa-
nies to adopt these provisions “just in case.”4  Galaviz is likely not the 
last word on the enforceability of forum-selection provisions in char-
ters and bylaws.  Depending on the contract analysis a federal court 
accepts, some courts may find forum-selection provisions contractually 
binding on shareholders while others, like the court in Galaviz, will 
not.5  The impact of Galaviz hinges on whether other courts choose to 
invalidate forum-selection clauses contained in bylaws, in which case 
corporations will need to find other ways to respond to costly share-
holder litigation, or whether courts will reject the Galaviz contract 
analysis, enabling boards of directors to rely on the enforceability of 
the forum-selection provisions they adopt. 
I argue in this Case Note that in spite of the Galaviz decision, un-
der federal procedural law governing the enforceability of such provi-
sions, forum-selection provisions in bylaws that are unilaterally 
adopted by a board of directors should be contractually binding on 
shareholders.  In Part I, I describe the typical content of charters and 
bylaws of Delaware corporations, as well as the ways by which charters 
and bylaws can be amended, asking preliminarily whether amend-
ments to charters and bylaws are contractually binding under Dela-
 
4 See, e.g., Stephen LaSala, Risk Management Techniques for Today’s M&A Transactions 
(“[D]elaware corporations, particularly those that are publicly traded, should consider 
the adoption of a forum-selection bylaw.”), in ADVISING CLIENTS IN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS, 2011 ED., LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING RECENT LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS, HANDLING CROSS-BORDER M AND A DEALS, AND NAVIGATING 
THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE 10 (2011). 
5 See Brian v. Breheny et al., Skadden 2011 Insights:  Global M&A (“It would not be 
surprising to see additional stockholder challenges testing the validity of such ‘choice 
of forum’ provisions in Delaware and other courts in 2011.”), in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2011:  
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 299, 308 (2011); 
LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (“[C]ompanies should be advised that such clauses are a rela-
tively new phenomenon, and their enforceability remains uncertain.”); Faith Stevel-
man, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 134 (2009) (“Even where they passed muster in a shareholder 
vote, the provisions would be tested by plaintiffs in litigation beyond Delaware.  One 
state’s conclusion about the enforceability of the charter forum restriction would not 
be binding on another.”); Charles M. Nathan, New Challenges and Strategies for Designat-
ing Delaware as Jurisdiction for Corporate Disputes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE & FIN. REG. (May 11, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/ 
05/11/new-challenges-and-strategies-for-designating-delaware-as-jurisdiction-for-corporate-
disputes (“[Galaviz] is not the last word on the subject and additional cases will be 
needed to test the viability of exclusive jurisdiction bylaws before we know whether 
shareholder approval is required and whether exclusive jurisdiction provisions will be 
enforced by jurisdictions other than Delaware . . . .”). 
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ware law.  In Part II, I present the current state of the law on forum-
selection provisions in contracts, and then examine the kinds of fo-
rum-selection provisions that have recently been incorporated into 
corporate charters and bylaws.  In Part III, I describe Vice Chancellor 
Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon, which set the stage for the California dis-
trict court’s contract analysis in Galaviz v. Berg, presented in Part IV.  
Finally, in Part V, I analyze the board of directors–shareholder rela-
tionship in terms of a requirements contract, and conclude that fo-
rum-selection provisions should be enforceable under federal 
procedural law governing such provisions.  
 
I. CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 
 
Before evaluating the contractual enforceability of provisions con-
tained in charters and bylaws, it is necessary to understand what rela-
tionships these documents govern and how the documents can be 
amended under Delaware corporate law.  The primary governing 
document of any corporation is the corporate charter, sometimes re-
ferred to as the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation or Certificate 
of Incorporation.  Under Delaware law, the charter must set forth the 
name and address of the corporation, the nature of the business to be 
conducted, and any preferred stock the corporation intends to issue 
in addition to its common stock.6  The charter may also contain a pro-
vision conferring upon the board of directors the power to adopt, 
amend, and repeal bylaws.7  
Bylaws are the secondary governing documents of a corporation.  
Bylaws delineate “the rules and regulations or private laws enacted by 
the corporation to regulate, govern and control its own actions, affairs 
and concerns and its shareholders or members and its directors and 
officers with relation to each other and among themselves in their re-
lation to the corporation.”8  Bylaws “may contain any provision, not 
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating 
to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its 
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, 
officers or employees.”9  Bylaws are, unlike shareholder resolutions,10 
 
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(1)–(4) (2011). 
7 Id. § 109(a). 
8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF  
CORPORATIONS § 4166, at 655 (Carol A. Jones ed., 2010). 
9 Tit. 8, § 109(b). 
10 See Edward D. Herlihy, Takeover Law and Practice 2009 (“A board of directors has 
no legal obligation under state or federal law to accept or act upon precatory share-
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binding on a board of directors, although subsidiary to any provisions 
included in the charter. 
 
A. Are Charters Contracts? 
 
A charter defines the relationship between the board of directors 
and the shareholders in a corporation.  However, the manner by 
which charters (and bylaws) may be amended is a function of the cor-
porate law of the state in which a corporation is incorporated.11  Fur-
ther, the procedures by which charters (and bylaws) are amended may 
or may not comport with the requirements of contract law.  In Dela-
ware, provisions find their way into a charter in one of two ways:  (1) a 
provision may be placed in a charter at the time of incorporation,12 or 
(2) a provision may be incorporated into the charter upon the adop-
tion of a resolution by the board of directors and a majority vote of 
the shareholders.13  Because a charter amendment requires both a 
resolution by the board of directors and a shareholder vote, charters 
have more “contractual force” than bylaws, which is why “variations 
from the conventional model of corporate governance” are usually 
included in charters rather than bylaws.14  Still, even where rights are 
delineated in a charter, those rights differ from contractual rights.15 
 
holder proposals that receive the vote of a majority of the outstanding shares 
 entitled to vote.”), in PRACTISING LAW INST., CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE  
CONTROL 2010:  CURRENT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A  
TRANSACTIONS 339, 365 (2010). 
11 See infra notes 13, 16-18, and accompanying text.   
12 Tit. 8, § 102.  
13 Id. § 242(b)(1); see also Steven M. Davidoff, A Litigation Plan That Would Favor Del-
aware, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2010/10/26/a-litigation-plan-that-would-favor-delaware (suggesting that including a 
provision in a charter at the time of incorporation is easier than submitting a resolu-
tion to a shareholder vote). 
14 G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 542 
n.166 (1989); see also LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COM-
MENTARY:  DESIGNATING DELAWARE’S COURT OF CHANCERY AS THE EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION FOR INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTES:  A NEW “MUST” FOR DELAWARE 
COMPANY CHARTER OR BYLAWS 1 (2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/ 
pubContent/_pdf/pub3510_1.pdf (“Subject to the complications of a shareholder 
approval process, amending a company’s charter to include a forum selection provi-
sion is generally preferable to amending its bylaws.”). 
15 See Jennifer B. Poppe & Alithea Z. Sullivan, Could the Supreme Court’s Enforcement of 
Arbitration in Concepcion Reverberate in the Securities Litigation Sphere?, SEC. LITIG. REP., 
Sept. 2011, at 1, 3 (“The most obvious distinction between contractual and shareholder 
rights is that only the latter may be altered without consent . . . .  [E]ven when a major-
ity vote by shareholders is required, dissenting shareholders have far less recourse than 
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B. Are Bylaws Contracts? 
 
Under Delaware law, bylaws may be adopted in one of three ways.  
First, initial incorporators may unilaterally adopt, amend, or repeal 
bylaws before stock in the corporation has been sold.16  Second, after 
stock has been sold, stockholders entitled to vote may adopt, amend, 
or repeal bylaws by majority vote.17  Finally, as noted above, a charter 
may authorize a board of directors to unilaterally adopt, amend, and 
repeal bylaws without shareholder vote, subject to the limitation that 
this power “shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, 
nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”18  This third 
option is available to most, but not all, corporations.19  
Subject to Section 109(b)’s limitation on appropriate subjects for 
bylaws,20 Delaware law considers bylaws adopted by any of these meth-
ods to be binding on both the board of directors and the sharehold-
ers.21  While “bylaws are often described as a contract among the 
members of a corporation,”22 the analysis in Delaware centers not on 
whether the method by which a bylaw is adopted creates a contractually 
binding relationship between the board of directors and shareholders, 
 
a party to a conventional contract.”); Stevelman, supra note 5, at 132 (explaining that 
“consent” is conceptualized differently in corporate law than in contract law, since in 
corporate law consent means “a vote of the majority of shares is binding on the rest”).  
But see SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND TENDER OFFERS:  
LAWS AND STRATEGIES § 5:2.8 (2011) (emphasizing that forum-selection provisions 
affect only intra-company litigation, in which both parties involved in the litigation are 
parties to the board of directors–shareholder relationship). 
16 See tit. 8, § 109(a). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.; see also Frederick H. Alexander & Daniel D. Matthews, The Multi-Jurisdictional 
Stockholder Litigation Problem and the Forum Selection Solution, BNA’S CORP. COUNSEL 
WKLY., May 11, 2011, at 2, 3 (“Assuming the corporation’s charter authorizes its board 
to amend the bylaws, the board can adopt such a provision without stockholder action.  
The stockholders would, however, retain the unilateral authority to amend the bylaws.” 
(citations omitted)). 
19 See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS Form 1.5 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he 
Board of Directors of the corporation is expressly authorized to make, alter and repeal 
the bylaws of the corporation, subject to the power of the stockholders of the corpora-
tion to alter or repeal any by-law whether adopted by them or otherwise.”); Stevelman, 
supra note 5, at 132 (noting that it “is often the case” that a charter grants a board of 
directors the power to unilaterally amend bylaws). 
20 See tit. 8, § 109(b). 
21 See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that because Delaware 
law is “deferential to corporate judgment,” the Court of Chancery typically  
“presumes that corporate bylaw and charter provisions . . . are valid and should be  
specifically enforced”). 
22 See FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 4166, at 653. 
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but instead on whether the method by which a bylaw is adopted is au-
thorized under state law.  Practitioners’ documents frequently warn 
against reading literally courts’ contract-analysis language.23  
 
II. FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS 
 
Provisions specifying the forum in which a dispute among  
contracting parties must be brought are common in commercial  
contracts.  They are, however, a recent phenomenon in the world of  
corporate governance.   
 
A. Forum-Selection Provisions in Contracts 
 
Forum-selection provisions specify the forum where, in the event of 
breach, a contracting party may file suit.  Commercial agreements  
often contain forum-selection clauses, including thirty-nine percent of 
contracts appended to Form 8-Ks and roughly eighty-seven percent of 
public company merger agreements.24  Since The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Company,25 forum-selection provisions in contracts are presump-
tively enforceable, provided that the choice of forum is reasonable.26  
In determining the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in con-
tracts, federal courts consider, among other things, (1) “whether the 
 
23 See id. § 4166, at 654 (noting that the “language of a contract used by the courts 
should not mislead the practitioner into believing that courts will actually treat bylaws 
exactly as they would a contract,” especially when bylaw provisions are contrary to state 
law or when enforcement would cause “unreasonable hardship to the other sharehold-
ers”); see also 6 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION ON LITIGATION, BUSINESS AND  
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 72:19 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 
2011) (describing Kirleis v. Dickie McCamey & Chilcote PC, 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009), 
which held that a shareholder must have explicitly assented to a bylaw provision requir-
ing arbitration for that bylaw to apply to her, and noting that “the Third Circuit chose 
not to apply the well-settled corporate principle that members of the corporation are 
presumed to know and understand the corporation’s bylaws”). 
24 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law Sch. & The Rock Ctr. for Corporate Gov-
ernance, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation:  Mandatory and 
Elective Approaches, slide 2 (Oct. 6 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1690561 (describing the “demographics” of forum-selection clauses and the dramatic 
recent increase in their usage). 
25 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (analyzing the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in an 
international towage contract). 
26 See 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 3803.1, at 51-52 (3d ed. 2007) (“Today, the common understanding is that these 
provisions are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown 
to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular contract.”). 
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challengers were aware of their potential liability,” (2) “whether the 
challengers were experienced business people,” (3) “whether the fo-
rum-selection clause was hidden,” (4) “whether enforcement of the 
forum-selection clause would deprive the challenger of his or her  
‘day in court,’” and (5) “whether any related case was pending 
 in the selected forum.”27 
 
B. Forum-Selection Provisions in Charters and Bylaws 
 
Forum-selection provisions appear in corporate charters and by-
laws in two forms:  mandatory provisions, which state that litigation 
must be brought in the state of incorporation, and elective provisions, 
which state that the corporation has the option to keep litigation in 
the state of incorporation or to litigate a claim brought in another 
state if it so elects.28  The law firm Latham and Watkins has suggested 
that corporations adopt the following elective provision in their bylaws:   
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and ex-
clusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on be-
half of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the Corporation to the 
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting 
a claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any provision of the 
[Delaware General Corporation Law], or the Corporation’s Certificate of 
Incorporation or Bylaws, or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the 
Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine.
29
 
The circumstances enumerated in this model provision seek to apply 
the forum-selection provision to all disputes between the board of di-
rectors and the shareholders.30 
 
27 See 1A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 1:697 (2002).  But see 
WRIGHT, supra note 26, § 3803.1, at 69 (“There is no requirement, beyond notice, that 
the forum clause be the subject of bargaining.”). 
28 See Davidoff, supra note 13 (explaining that forum-selection provisions in bylaws 
can be phrased either “as a requirement that all shareholder litigation would occur in 
the jurisdiction of incorporation or as an option for the corporation to elect that all 
shareholder litigation would occur in the state of incorporation”); Grundfest,  
supra note 24, at slide 6 (describing the difference between mandatory and  
elective provisions). 
29 LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 5.  But see id. at 6, n.24 (“[W]e do 
not recommend including a clause concerning deemed notice or consent, such as ‘Any 
person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital 
stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the provi-
sions of this Article . . . .’”). 
30 See Alexander & Matthews, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the circumstances un-
der which forum-selection provisions do and do not apply); see also LATHAM & WAT-
KINS LLP, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining that forum-selection clauses are useful “for 
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III. IN RE REVLON, INC. SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION 
 
In In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster 
addressed the question of whether the lead counsel in a shareholder 
action should be replaced for failing to advocate adequately on behalf 
of its clients.31  The Vice Chancellor balanced the possibility that dis-
qualification could incentivize law firms to provide more diligent rep-
resentation against the likelihood that shareholders might respond to 
such disqualifications by bringing suits outside of Delaware to avoid 
the risk of having counsel removed.32  In dicta, Vice Chancellor Laster 
commented that Delaware corporate law might permit corporations to 
adopt forum-selection provisions in their charters:   
Perhaps greater judicial oversight of frequent filers [of derivative suits] 
will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by filing in other 
jurisdictions.  If they do, and if boards of directors and stockholders be-
lieve that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to re-
spond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for  
intra-entity disputes.
33 
While the Vice Chancellor referred explicitly to forum-selection 
provisions adopted in charters, the accompanying string cite34 carried 
the implicit suggestion that forum-selection provisions could be 
adopted in bylaws as well.35  
 
the resolution of all intra-corporate disputes including claims asserting breach of fidu-
ciary duty or seeking, under state law, to overturn directors’ business judgments con-
cerning matters ranging from the routine to potential M&A or other transformative 
transactions”); Davidoff, supra note 13 (explaining that forum-selection provisions 
would apply only to state law claims, and would not affect federal claims, such as SEC 
enforcement actions). 
31 990 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
32 Id. at 960. 
33 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
34 Id. at 960 n.8.  The string cite included:  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) 
(2011) (describing the limits of what kinds of provisions can be adopted in corporate 
charters); Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999) (allowing 
an LLC agreement to select arbitration as its exclusive forum for litigating disputes); 
Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (en-
forcing a provision in an LLC agreement requiring that all intra-entity disputes be 
arbitrated); Stevelman, supra note 5, at 133-35 (arguing that forum selection provisions 
contained in charters and bylaws should be enforced under Delaware law); Sara Lewis, 
Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” 
Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199 (2008) (same). 
35 See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION ON LITIGATION, supra note 23, § 72:19 (interpret-
ing In re Revlon to mean that forum-selection provisions could be adopted not only in 
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A. Why Keep Cases in Delaware? 
 
When corporations adopt forum-selection provisions in their char-
ters or bylaws, they generally do so to ensure that derivative suits are 
brought in Delaware.  Requiring that matters be decided by the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery affects settlement value in derivative suits 
both by providing increased certainty in outcomes36 and by eliminat-
ing the increased costs of litigating in multiple forums.37  Some practi-
tioners, however, have argued that an “out-of-Delaware trend” has led 
to the strategic filing of derivative suits in forums other than Delaware 
in order to exploit the increased settlement value.38  Adopting a  
forum-selection provision in a corporation’s charter or bylaws is one 
effective way to counteract strategic filings, a solution undoubtedly 
endorsed by Vice Chancellor Laster in response to these concerns. 
 
 
 
charters, but in all governance documents); see also Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 19 
(“Because forum-selection provisions both relate to shareholder power and limit 
shareholder power, forum-selection provisions are appropriately included either  
in the bylaws or charter.”). 
36 See LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (“A [] clause that requires a lawsuit to be resolved 
by the Delaware Chancery Court takes advantage of Delaware’s well-developed body of 
corporate case law, the court’s expertise in handling these types of cases, and its gen-
eral reluctance to delay or enjoin transactions [which] can significantly limit [] uncer-
tainty and cost . . . .”); LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that 
the Delaware Chancery Court is the “nation’s preeminent forum” regarding precedent, 
experience, focus, and quality, which makes interpretation and application of the law 
more predictable); SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, 
2011 INSIGHTS 53 (2011) (arguing that settlement value is lowered in Delaware be-
cause “the Court of Chancery does not pose the risk of a jury trial or punitive damages 
if the case proceeds past a preliminary injunction phase”); Lewis, supra note 34, at 201-
02 (suggesting that outcomes are more uncertain when other states apply their own 
corporate laws in spite of the internal affairs doctrine, which would require application 
of Delaware corporate law). 
37 See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (arguing that forum-selection 
provisions prevent cases from being litigated in multiple forums at once, which reduces 
litigation costs). 
38 For example, during an acquisitions deal, shareholders of the target often bring 
opportunistic suits for their settlement value, though these suits “rarely prevent deals 
from going through.”  See LaSala, supra note 4, at 9.  These suits are considered an 
unavoidable cost of doing a deal because there is relatively little a corporation can do 
to prevent them.  Forum-selection provisions, however, can decrease settlement value 
by increasing certainty in outcomes.  But see John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian 
Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 22-28 (Univ. of Cambridge Legal Stud. Res. Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 37/2011, 2011) (explaining that since 2001, cases have 
been moving out of Delaware, but arguing that because other forums have always been 
uncertain, the cause of the “out-of-Delaware” trend might be that Delaware judges have 
become overly skeptical of the plaintiffs’ bar). 
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B. Reaction to In re Revlon 
 
Forum-selection provisions in charters and bylaws first surfaced in 
the early 1990s, but between 1991 and 2010 only sixteen corporations 
had such provisions in place.39  In 2010, significantly more corpora-
tions began adopting forum-selection provisions in their bylaws and 
charters in response to Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon.40  
After the decision, at least twenty-three corporations adopted forum-
selection provisions.41  While Vice Chancellor Laster’s comment re-
ferred to provisions adopted in charters, most corporations responded 
by adopting such provisions in their bylaws, because doing so does not 
require a shareholder vote.42  As of May 2011, at least thirty-seven cor-
porations had forum-selection provisions in their charters, and eleven 
others included charter or bylaw proposals in proxy materials for their 
2011 meetings.43  With the recent surge in the adoption of forum-
selection provisions in bylaws, practitioners have circulated memoran-
da speculating about whether these provisions will be enforceable.44  
 
39 See Davidoff, supra note 13 (describing the emerging trend of corporations 
adopting forum-selection provisions); see also Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 3 
(demonstrating that from the In re Revlon decision to September 2010, this number 
increased from sixteen to thirty-nine).  There was also a period in 2006 during which 
forum-selection provisions were added to bylaws, including Netlist, Inc.’s and Oracle 
Corp.’s provisions, the subject of Galaviz.  See Davidoff, supra note 13. 
40 See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Such bylaws 
are reportedly a recent phenomenon, apparently occasioned by a passing comment in 
In re Revlon, Inc. . . .”); Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 3 (terming the adoption of 
forum-selection provisions the “Revlon effect”); Breheny, supra note 5, at 308 (“A num-
ber of prominent companies already have adopted such provisions.”); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay:  Contractual Unconscionability, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1229 (2011) (noting that “dozens” of corporations adopted forum-
selection provisions in their bylaws in response to In re Revlon); LaSala, supra note 4, at 
9 (claiming that the adoption of forum-selection provisions is a “rapidly growing 
trend,” and noting the connection to In re Revlon). 
41 See Davidoff, supra note 13. 
42 As explained in more detail below, Delaware Code Section 109(a)obviates the 
need for a shareholder vote when the charter contains a provision authorizing the 
board of directors to amend the bylaws unilaterally.  See Alexander & Matthews,  
supra note 18, at 3. 
43 See Nathan, supra note 5. 
44 See, e.g., Breheny, supra note 5, at 308 (discussing the Galaviz decision and the 
possibility of future challenges to forum-selection provisions); Patrick E. Gibbs, Hot 
Topics in Corporate Governance Litigation:  Recent Developments in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery (speculating about the effect of Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon), 
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT  
INSTITUTE 2010, at 715 (2010); LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (urging the adoption of 
forum-selection provisions based on In re Revlon and in spite of Galaviz); Nathan, supra 
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IV. GALAVIZ V. BERG 
 
In 2011, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
addressed—for the first time—whether a shareholder could bring a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim in federal court despite a forum-
selection provision in the corporation’s bylaws requiring that deriva-
tive suits be brought in Delaware.45  The court in Galaviz v. Berg held 
that, under federal procedural law applying contract principles  
to forum-selection provisions, such a provision contained in a bylaw  
that was unilaterally adopted by a board of directors was not  
binding on shareholders.46 
Because Galaviz addressed a derivative suit that included a federal 
cause of action, federal law, and not Delaware law, applied.  In decid-
ing the case under federal law, the Galaviz court implicitly accepted 
the defendant’s argument that contract law was an appropriate lens 
through which to examine the relationship between boards of direc-
tors and shareholders.47  The plaintiff-shareholders argued in their 
opposition to the defendant-board’s motion to dismiss that no con-
tract existed between the shareholders and board of directors because 
the shareholders did not consent to be bound by the provision.48  The 
court found, in agreement with the plaintiffs, that bylaw provisions 
adopted by a board of directors without a shareholder vote were not 
contractually binding on shareholders, because the shareholders did 
 
note 5 (predicting that Galaviz will not be the only response to the trend in Delaware 
of adopting forum-selection provisions in bylaws). 
45 Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (quoting Oracle’s forum-selection provision:  
“The sole and exclusive forum for any actual or purported derivative action brought on 
behalf of the Corporation shall be the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware”). 
46 Id. at 1174-75. 
47 The corporation cited the following for its argument that bylaws should be 
treated as a contract between the board and the shareholders:   
See, e.g., Stolow v. Greg Manning Auctions Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on the contractual nature of bylaws to dismiss for lack 
of standing a third party's claim that an association had failed to comply with its 
own bylaws); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 
2008) (characterizing a bylaw that shareholders proposed to adopt as an “in-
ternal governance contract,” and holding it to be an impermissible limitation 
on directors' obligation to exercise certain fiduciary duties); see also Andrews 
Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., 258 F.R.D. 640, 648 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“It is generally ac-
cepted that corporate bylaws are to be construed according to the general rules 
governing the construction of statutes and contracts.”).  
763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
48 See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Nominal Defendant Oracle’s Motion to Dismiss at 7, 
Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 10-4233),  
2011 WL 5189617. 
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not assent to the terms of the bylaw.49  The court reasoned that 
“[u]nder contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement may 
serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them 
were specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a 
contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify  
contractual provisions.”50  Thus, the court focused on the contract- 
ually binding effect of bylaw amendment procedures authorized  
under Delaware state law. 
The importance of the Galaviz decision lies in its potential effect 
on how practitioners should advise boards of directors seeking to 
adopt forum-selection provisions in bylaws.  If shareholders file federal 
claims in the Northern District of California, then the court will follow 
Galaviz and refuse to enforce a forum-selection provision adopted uni-
laterally by the board.  But what if shareholders file in other districts?  
If the consensus among federal courts is that forum-selection provi-
sions in bylaws are unenforceable under contract principles, then a 
board of directors will have to find some other way of addressing the 
problems posed by shareholder suits brought in courts outside of Del-
aware.  I argue in the next Part, however, that other federal courts 
should not follow the Galaviz reasoning, and should instead find that 
forum-selection provisions in corporate bylaws are contractually bind-
ing on shareholders.  As a consequence, boards of directors should 
continue to adopt these provisions as a response to shareholders who 
strategically file suit outside of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
49 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.  The scope of this holding might be limited to instances 
in which bylaws are adopted by the same board implicated in the wrongdoing that 
forms the subject of the derivative suit and adopted after the alleged wrongdoing oc-
curred.  See id. at 1171 (suggesting that the holding in Galaviz is limited to the specific 
facts of the case); Lasala, supra note 4, at 101 (explaining that the court might have 
found the forum-selection provision enforceable if it had been adopted by a different 
board); Adam M. Turteltaub, et al., California Court Rejects the Enforceability of a Delaware 
Forum Selection Clause in Corporate Bylaws, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2011, 
at 15  (“Had Oracle’s bylaws included a forum selection clause prior to any alleged 
wrongdoing and/or the purchase of shares in Oracle by the plaintiffs, the district court 
may have come to a different conclusion.”).  However, the fact that a board must adopt 
bylaws in good faith should not affect the contract analysis with respect to mutual as-
sent, and thus supports the view that the Galaviz holding should not be so narrow. 
50 Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
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V. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:  SHAREHOLDER RELATIONSHIP  
AS A REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT 
 
The court in Galaviz found that a forum-selection provision con-
tained in a bylaw unilaterally adopted by a board of directors was not 
binding on shareholders because the shareholders did not assent to 
the provision.51  In so holding, the court conceptualized the contract 
formed between the shareholders and board of directors at the time 
the shareholders purchased stock as a static set of rights and obliga-
tions between the two parties, in which all terms were specified at the 
time of assent.  In this case, any amendment to the terms would create 
a contract—in the case of a unilaterally adopted bylaw, this new con-
tract would be invalid for lack of mutual assent.  However, this analysis 
fails to recognize that a corporate charter explicitly and intentionally 
leaves some terms open by allowing shareholders and the board of 
directors to unilaterally adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.52  The 
Galaviz court noted that Oracle’s forum-selection provision was not 
present in the “existing contract terms” at the time the plaintiff-
shareholders purchased stock.53  While this may be true, it is also the 
case that the possibility of a forum-selection provision was “present  
in the original agreement.”54  
Because the charter intentionally leaves some terms open, it is not 
accurate to analyze the contract as a static picture of the state of the 
corporate charter and bylaw amendments in place at the time an indi-
vidual shareholder purchased her shares.  The contract, instead, is an 
exchange of all the rights afforded to shareholders as defined by the 
charter and state corporate laws in consideration for the shares’ pur-
 
51 Id. at 1174. 
52 See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 19, at Form 1.5 (“[T]he Board of Di-
rectors of the Corporation is expressly authorized to make, alter and repeal the by-laws of the 
Corporation, subject to the powers of the stockholders of the Corporation to alter or 
repeal any by-law whether adopted by them or otherwise.” (emphasis added)).  Note 
that shareholders also have the authority to adopt shareholders agreements without 
the consent of the board of directors.  See Gibbs, supra note 44, at 718 (“Corporate 
charters and bylaws would seem to confer benefits on stockholders no less than corpo-
rate shareholders agreements confer benefits on directors; if nothing else, it would 
seem that shareholders foresee being bound by them.”); Federal Courts Needn’t Honor 
Delaware Venue-Choice Bylaw, Judge Says, 28 WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET 7, 7 
(2011) (citing Professor Joseph Grundfest’s argument that even though directors are 
typically the party to adopt forum-selection provisions in the bylaws, shareholders 
could vote to amend the bylaws to choose a different forum or to repeal a  
forum-selection provision). 
53 Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
54 Id. 
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chase price and an agreement to be bound by the corporate charter 
and bylaws, incorporating the mutual understanding that the bylaws, 
and in more limited circumstances the charter, are subject to adop-
tion, amendment, and repeal.  The shareholder, in purchasing her 
shares, agrees to be bound by the corporate charter and the provisions 
therein defining the relationship between the shareholder and the 
board of directors.55  She agrees to be bound by the terms of the char-
ter, including any provision that allows the board of directors to 
amend the bylaws unilaterally, because she knows that the board is 
confined by fiduciary duties and the shareholders’ ability to repeal or 
amend any bylaw by majority vote.  
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-204, a contract 
with open terms is valid if the contracting parties intend to be bound 
by such terms and there is a reasonably certain basis for remedy.56  
When a shareholder purchases shares in a corporation, she clearly 
intends to be bound by the corporate charter and bylaws and expects 
the board likewise to be bound.  In the case of a forum-selection pro-
vision, the certain basis for remedy is specific enforcement—in other 
words, the dismissal of any suit brought outside of the forum specified.  
Further, a shareholder’s agreement to be bound by a board’s sub-
sequent unilateral adoption of a bylaw containing a forum-selection 
provision is comparable to a requirements contract in which key terms 
are left open in order to adapt to market fluctuations.57  Under U.C.C. 
 
55 See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“[A]lthough the 
by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its stockholders, the contract was 
subject to the board’s power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.” (citations omitted)). 
56 See U.C.C. § 2-204 (3) (2009) (“Even if one or more terms are left open, a con-
tract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”). 
57 See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have to Be Ludwig Wittgenstein”:  How Llewellyn’s Concept 
of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-quantity Contracts, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 
67, 75 (2006) (“Most of modern contract law, the law of open-quantity agreements 
included, can be seen as developing from a need, arising in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, to address contingencies occasioned by new forms of com-
merce and industry.”); id. at 76 n.25 (“‘Large-scale production and expanding markets 
create[d] greater uncertainties and more business hazards . . . .To meet [the demand 
of more complex allocations of risk] many types of contracts have come into use con-
taining various provisions for the fixing of terms with reference to future events.’” 
(quoting Harold C. Havighurst & Signey M. Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 
27 ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1932) (first alteration in original))). 
The law of requirements contracts provides special insight into the relationship be-
tween a board of directors and shareholders for two reasons.  The first is that a board 
of directors is constrained by its fiduciary duties to shareholders such that even when a 
board of directors unilaterally acts to amend bylaws or makes other business judg-
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§ 2-306, a contract is valid even when a quantity of goods is not speci-
fied, so long as the actual goods the purchaser ends up requiring in 
good faith from the seller turn out to be reasonable in light of what 
the parties estimated from prior dealings.58  In the “contract” between 
the board of directors and a shareholder, the unspecified terms in-
clude all of the bylaws that a board of directors might unilaterally 
 
ments, it must do so in good faith and with the best interests of the shareholders in 
mind.  Compare Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the duty 
of good faith is a component of a board of directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty), with 
Shelley Smith, A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quantity  
Contracts:  Reforming the Law of Exclusivity and Good Faith, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 871, 877 
(2009) (noting that requirements contracts allow a buyer to reduce his requirements 
to zero only if he does so in good faith), and id. (explaining that the duty of good faith 
eliminates the need for requirements contracts to be exclusive and provides a gauge 
for when a requirements contract has been breached).  Nevertheless, a board of direc-
tors must make business decisions in response to changing conditions in the corporate 
market and therefore requires the discretion to react to conditions unanticipated by 
the parties upon the formation of the shareholder-board relationship.  Compare 
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors . . . .”), R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16[D], at 4-146 (3d ed.) 
(Supp. 2011) (describing the duties of an independent board of directors, which in-
clude seeking advice on fluctuating market conditions in the industry), and D. Gordon 
Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 174 
(2011) (“In a system in which private ordering is encouraged, corporate bylaws, 
through experience and adaptation, become solutions to common governance prob-
lems faced by corporations.”), with WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, 1 UNIFORM  
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-306:1 (explaining that requirements contracts allow 
parties to adapt to the problem of over- and underproduction when needs change in a 
fluctuating market), and S. Smith, supra, at 883 (identifying changes in consumer pref-
erences, advances in technology, and market fluctuations as factors affecting the terms 
in a requirements contract).  Second, a provision in the charter granting the board of  
directors authority to amend the bylaws without a shareholder vote reflects an “alloca-
tion of discretion,” which is reflected in the price paid by the shareholder for her 
shares.  Compare D. G. Smith et al., supra, at 128 (proposing reforms that would allow 
shareholders to amend bylaws more easily in order to “produce more diversity and 
experimentation in corporate governance” in response to changing market condi-
tions), with Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts:  Reining 
in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 327 (2002) (illustrating that in a require-
ments contract, one party’s “freedom to alter the quantity taken [is] typically circum-
scribed to take into account [the other party’s] reliance,” and that one party’s freedom 
to alter terms allows the other party to negotiate for more consideration). 
58 See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1) (“A term which measures the quantity by the output of the 
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as 
may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any 
stated estimate . . . or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be  
tendered . . . .”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) 
(recognizing the enforceability of requirements contracts under federal law, although 
suggesting that some requirements contracts may be anticompetitive). 
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adopt after a shareholder has purchased her shares, subject to the 
mandate that all such bylaws be free of language designed to deprive 
shareholders of their power to adopt bylaws of their own.59  The 
U.C.C. confines these terms by imposing two requirements:  the terms, 
once specified by one of the parties (the board of directors), must be 
made in good faith (in compliance with the directors’ fiduciary  
duties),60 and the terms must be in reasonable accordance with the 
estimations of the other party (the shareholder).61  
Thus, the following question emerges:  could shareholders reason-
ably foresee a board of directors unilaterally adopting a forum-
selection provision in the corporation’s bylaws?  The answer is not  
entirely clear.  On one hand, a charter provision explicitly authorizing 
the board of directors to adopt a forum-selection provision in the by-
laws would alert a reasonable shareholder to the possibility that the 
board could identify Delaware as the sole forum for derivative suits.  It 
is less obvious, however, that a broader charter provision, authorizing 
a board to adopt bylaws in general, alerts shareholders to the possibil-
ity of the board adopting a bylaw containing a forum-selection provi-
sion.  Still, a shareholder ought to foresee that a board with the  
authority to amend bylaws unilaterally might determine that keeping 
litigation in Delaware is in the best interests of the corporation. 
This argument—that the basis of a contract between a shareholder 
and corporation is the shareholder’s assent to the charter provision 
empowering the board of directors to amend the corporation’s by-
laws—responds to Sara Lewis’s argument in her Note Transforming the 
“Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution.62  
Addressing whether shareholders have a vested interest in their ability 
to bring suits in forums other than Delaware, Lewis focuses on whether 
a bylaw provision is binding in terms of notice.  Shareholders who 
purchase shares after the bylaws are amended lack actual notice but 
have constructive notice of the additional bylaw.  Even absent actual 
notice, purchasing in an “open and developed market” means that a 
shareholder bought “at a price that reflected the clause’s value.”63  
 
59 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
60 See Goldberg, supra note 57, at 324 (emphasizing the need for “devices for  
constraining discretion”). 
61 U.C.C. § 2-306 (1). 
62 Lewis, supra note 34.   
63 See Lewis, supra note 34, at 211; see also LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, 
at 3 (arguing that shareholders do not have a vested interest in litigating claims outside 
of Delaware because shareholders are aware of the possibility of bylaw amendments). 
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While notice of an amendment certainly is not the same as assent 
to it,64 Lewis’s argument emphasizes the fundamental fairness in bind-
ing shareholders to subsequent bylaws.  For shareholders not wishing 
to be bound by future bylaws, a share in a corporation that lacks such 
a charter provision would be more valuable.  It is particularly fair for 
board-adopted bylaws to bind shareholders because shareholders have 
at least two protections from undesirable amendments:  they can  
either repeal the bylaw with a majority vote,65 or can bring a derivative 
suit for breach of fiduciary duty if the adoption of a bylaw would not 
be protected as a valid business judgment.  Further, a shareholder 
may, in an open market, sell her shares in exchange for shares in a 
corporation without such a forum-selection provision.  While this is 
not a contract remedy, since selling one’s shares would not provide 
restitution damages to compensate for fluctuations in the market 
price of the share between the time of purchase and sale, it does sug-
gest that shareholders can “vote with their feet” to affect the availabil-
ity of certain bylaw provisions, such as forum-selection provisions, in 
the Delaware corporate market.  When shareholders assent to the 
terms of a charter providing that shareholders will be bound by future 
bylaws adopted by the board, shareholders should be contractually 
bound by such provisions in board-adopted bylaws. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Galaviz holding that forum-selection provisions in bylaws uni-
laterally adopted by a board of directors do not bind shareholders  
under federal procedural law governing forum-selection provisions is 
just one possible response to Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re 
Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.  As this Note argues, shareholders 
should be bound by such bylaw amendments.  This Note urges future 
 
64 Lewis claims that a dissenting shareholder can only be presumed to have assent-
ed if a business judgment, like a board’s unilateral adoption of a bylaw, maximizes the 
value of a corporation.  Lewis, supra note 34, at 213.  She then argues that it should not 
be left to the courts’ discretion to determine whether a business judgment in fact max-
imized the corporation’s value, and thus a court should not attempt to determine 
whether a shareholder necessarily assented to a bylaw provision.  Id.  This argument 
does not answer the question of whether a shareholder in fact assented to a bylaw pro-
vision, and the corollary question of whether there is a binding contract between the 
shareholder and the board of directors.  A more satisfying answer is the one I have 
proposed in this Note–-that even dissenting shareholders can be said to have assented 
to a bylaw amendment when that amendment was authorized in the charter to which 
the shareholder did in fact assent.   
65 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011). 
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federal courts to look past the narrow contract analysis of Galaviz and 
uphold forum-selection provisions in bylaw amendments.  While 
Galaviz may have been the first word on the subject, it is certainly not 
the last. 
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